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# West Europe Report

(FOUO 52/80)



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## WEST EUROPE REPORT

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### CONTENTS

#### THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

##### INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

- Views on Security, Cooperation Conference in Madrid  
(DEFENSE ET DIPLOMATIE, 17 Nov 80)..... 1

##### SPAIN

- Oreja, Ruperez Formulate Spanish Positions on CSCE Issues  
(Antonio Sanchez-Gijon; EUROPA-ARCHIV, 25 Oct 80)..... 4

#### ENERGY ECONOMICS

##### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

- Progress in Conserving Energy Reported  
(Kurt Bremer; STERN, 30 Oct 80)..... 15

#### COUNTRY SECTION

##### INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

- Briefs  
Tank Outlook Reviewed..... 17

##### FRANCE

- PSF's Dilemma, Numerous Candidates Mark 1981 Election  
(Thierry Pfister; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 27 Oct-2 Nov 80).... 18
- How Garaud Affects RPR's Chirac in 1981 Elections  
(Georges Mamy; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 3-9 Nov 80)..... 23
- PSF's Mitterrand-Rocard Duel: Analysis of Styles, Beliefs  
(Robert Schneider; L'EXPRESS, 18-24 Oct 80)..... 26
- On Opposite Sides, by Robert Schneider  
Mitterrand's Position, by Arthur Conte

- a -

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Manufacture, Modernization of Tank Turrets Described  
(Pascal Gambiez; ARMEES D'AUJOURD' HUI, Oct 80)..... 33

Briefs  
Conscientious Objectors 37

SPAIN

Markiegui Defines Political Philosophy of Euskadiko Eskerra  
(Xabier Markeigui; CAMBIO 16, 26 Oct 80)..... 38

Ultrarightist Carmona Reveals Biographical Details, Former Contacts  
(CAMBIO 16, 19 Oct 80)..... 40

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

VIEWS ON SECURITY, COOPERATION CONFERENCE IN MADRID

Paris DEFENSE ET DIPLOMATIE in French 17 Nov 80 pp 3-5

[Text] CSCE--The Chances of Detente and the Prospects of Disarmament

The Madrid Conference has just opened in an atmosphere of uncertainty: During the hours following this opening, nobody was able to say anything about the conference's survival chances. The very definite hardening of the Soviets over the past several days caused many worries particularly among the member countries of the Warsaw Pact and the neutral and nonaligned countries which were afraid that a failure or even an adjournment might jeopardize the entire CSCE process and, through it, whatever is left of detente. Nobody wanted to appear to be responsible for a rupture which would have serious diplomatic consequences in Europe. On top of that there is another factor of paralysis: The results of the American election, the vagueness regarding the intentions of the president-elect and his team regarding questions of defense and arms controls and a possible reorganization of American-Soviet relations would lead one to think that, so long as this situation lasts, there will be no real prospects of specific results at Madrid. For the Soviets, the overall balance seems to be in doubt: The new Congress has little chance of ratifying SALT II, such as it was signed in June 1979. Washington will undoubtedly have a different and more stubborn approach regarding SALT III and there is already talk in circles close to Reagan about the neutron bomb. Under these conditions, discussions or projects pertaining to security and cooperation in Europe, considered in Moscow (and, by the way, in Washington) as depending on strategic ratios between the two super powers, have little chance of leading anywhere. To the extent that the conference continues its work in spite of everything, we will be able only by the start of next year to evaluate the chances of success or failure of the CSCE process. Until such time as we know what the modalities of a "wait-and-see compromise" might be, one can evaluate the prospects of the conference concerning the issues of security and disarmament.

USSR--Trying to Be Patient

The Americans have hinted that the participation of the United States has good chances of being maintained after 20 January. Right now, there appear to be two major limitations that guide the attitude of

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the American delegation: First of all, the fact that the debate on the review of the implementation of the Final Act and above all the problem of human rights and the problem of the invasion of Afghanistan, must not be short-circuited or pushed through too fast; then there is the fact that the questions of security and disarmament must in the future not be separated from other problems. Over the past several days, several diplomats from the State Department admitted the worthwhile nature of a conference on security and confidence-building measures but they stressed the fact that such an undertaking could be accepted only within the formal framework of the CSCE process.

The Soviets seem to be trying to be patient. The USSR is waiting for the end of the storm (the debate on the review) and for the clarification of the situation on the new rules of the game of detente which the team of Mr. Reagan will come out with. In the meantime, the delegations from the countries of the Warsaw Pact are concentrating their efforts on the military aspects of detente within the context of CSCE and are trying to promote one of the key concepts of Soviet diplomacy, military detente.

Moscow counts very much on the interest expressed by most of the countries of Western Europe (members of the alliance, neutrals, or nonaligned) for the organization of an All-European conference devoted to the military aspects of detente. In view of the remote prospects of SALT III and the lack of progress in the MBFR, such a forum would renew and formalize the East-West dialogue on arms controls. Several conference proposals are ready for filing: The Polish conference project on military detente and disarmament in Europe which would be held in Warsaw (confidence-building measures, nonexpansion of blocs, nonuse of nuclear arms in a first strike), a Finnish proposal, several propositions coming from neutral and nonaligned countries aimed above all at the nature and conditions of the application of confidence-building measures. Finally, there is the French conference project on disarmament in Europe (EDC), announced since 1978; since then it has been the object of numerous discussions with the principal countries concerned, especially the FRG and the USSR. The French project for the EDC has already been backed by the Nine, the Council of Europe, and the Atlantic Council.

#### Zone Against Mandate: Prospects of EDC Project

The French project was from the very beginning divided into two phases. The first portion concerns the institution of confidence-building measures. The second portion deals with possible limitations of conventional forces on that territory. Paris is very hostile to the Eurostrategic framework and rules out all nuclear arms, feeling that a European framework (including the USSR, the countries of the Pact and the Western Europe countries but not the United States) makes it impossible to define the conditions that would satisfy a limitation of these arms. This exclusion of atomic arms for the time being remains a point of profound disagreement with the countries of the East and

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makes the second stage of the EDC project rather uncertain to say the least. Discussions might therefore be started early in 1981 on the basis of the EDC project reduced to its first half. Together with the other proposals, this project--if it were possible to get things going on the first level--might be filed with the conference (in other words, undoubtedly prior to an examination of the review) in order to be studied in committee.

The confidence-building measures proposed by France dealing with military activities by air and ground forces on European territory present two main characteristics which differentiate them from those provided and applied in the framework of the Final Act and those proposed in the other projects: Information on activities by military forces, notifications regarding maneuvers and verification through the participation of observers would be mandatory and would be applied to the entire European territory (from the Atlantic to the Urals), that is to say, also to all of Soviet territory. The basic idea behind the EDC project, as presented by Quai d'Orsay [French Foreign Office] is to wind up once again bringing up the question of the zone of application of the confidence-building measures provided for in the Final Act. These confidence-building measures as a matter of fact apply only "to maneuvers taking place within a zone having a depth of 250 kilometers from the border which faces any other participating European state," in other words, they exclude almost all of Soviet territory. It is said in Paris that, regarding the problem of extending the zone, a stubborn position will be maintained regardless of what may happen.

The USSR would very much like the Madrid conference to come out with a decision to summon a European conference on disarmament. The latter would enable the countries of Western Europe to dissociate themselves from the positions of NATO and the United States; it would constitute an excellent political-military "moving force" for the development of economic and technological cooperation; it would finally satisfy the wishes of the other countries of the Warsaw Pact which are concerned with strengthening detente and limiting their military efforts. In Paris it is felt thus that concessions on the zone would be the price to pay by the USSR so that a mandate for a such a conference would be obtained at Madrid.

The Soviet hardening and the procedural blockages in any case have a tendency to stiffen the respective positions of the countries of the Alliance and those of the Warsaw Pact. The former have made the problem of the examination of the review an imperative condition for the continuation of discussions and France, for example, does not expect to drop that demand in order to save the EDC. The latter, and especially the USSR, seem to believe that the benefits to be derived from the conference could well be less important than the negative fallout.

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3

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

SPAIN

OREJA, RUPEREZ FORMULATE SPANISH POSITIONS ON CSCE ISSUES

Bonn EUROPA-ARCHIV in German 25 Oct 80 pp 615-624

[Article by Secretary General of (Madrid) Institute for International Affairs Antonio Sanchez-Gijon : "Spain as Host of Second Follow-Up Meeting of CSCE"]

[Text] Changes in Spain's Foreign Policy Outlook

The choice of Madrid as a CSCE site following the first two meetings in Helsinki and Belgrade seemed to indicate that this third conference dedicated to the preservation of detente and European dialogue was once more being held in the capital of a neutral or non-aligned country. But Madrid does not really fit the pattern; it is the official seat of a western government negotiating for admission to the European Community and intent on joining NATO.

The changes in appearance are as pronounced as the changes in actual fact. When the Final Act of Helsinki was signed in 1975, Spain was still going through the last stages of the authoritarian Franco regime; it was isolated from the rest of Europe politically, was scarcely interested in world affairs and racked by internal controversy. By the time the Belgrade meeting ended Spain had elected its first democratic parliament and was in the process of drawing up the most modern constitution in Europe providing for a democratic system of parliamentary monarchy. Internationally, however, the government appeared to be pursuing a somewhat selective policy vis-a-vis Europe, giving preference to the European Community and not to NATO. The government's policies were based on economic relations with Europe and political relations with Latin America and the Arab world, with a growing tendency toward non-alignment which culminated in a Spanish "observer delegation" taking part in the 1979 conference of non-aligned nations in Havana. Now, in 1980, at the outset of the third round of CSCE, Spain has a constitution which embodies the political and human rights as well as the basic principles governing European cooperation as contained in the Helsinki Final Act. But Spain also experiences the unpleasant feeling that the outside world it has traditionally ignored and to which it has paid some attention in the recent past is cold, tough, selfish and that it is not too well equipped or well-placed to

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deal with this outside world skillfully and successfully. On the otherhand, Spain for the first time in years is faced with a serious domestic controversy over a foreign policy issue-- that of joining NATO by 1983. The debate on this issue will open in 1981, shortly after the conclusion of the Madrid conference.

To what an extent is this apparent change in Spain's international position due to greater maturity on the part of the political forces which constitute the government formed by the UCD under Minister President Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez or which support this government or to the doctrinal and political adjustments of its foreign policy goals? To what an extent is it due to adapting to an outside world which turns out to be less friendly than was hoped and is less prepared than was expected to let itself be discomfited by a new and unconstrained member of the international community? These questions are difficult to answer, since there are no political criteria by which to judge them: there has been no major debate on foreign policy in the Spanish parliament since it was constituted following the elections of 1 March 1979. During the election campaign, foreign policy issues were scarcely mentioned. The election results by and large reflected the tendency of the country to rally around two moderate parties-- one of these, the UCD belongs to the center by its own definition, and the other, the PSOE, belongs to the left wing. The parties of the right suffered severe losses while the PCE registered small gains. The election results, however, were not marked by this confirmation of basic political preferences but by the vigorous showing of regional and nationalistic parties which has given rise to great concern with respect to the organizational structure of the Spanish state. In 1980, the decisive question is not what Spain's role in the European system will be, but how the Spanish system itself will be structured.

Under the circumstances, the criteria which determine Spanish foreign policy are difficult to make out. Things become even more difficult, if one takes into account that this foreign policy considers mere gestures as important or even more important than official declarations. As a rule, it is the Minister President who makes the gestures. Whenever there is a question of laying down a concrete, official political course domestically or internationally, he usually is quite tight-lipped. But he becomes positively garrulous on world and security issues whenever the opportunity arises for talks with a major international figure or for letting his light shine in the exclusive circles to which journalists on his special list and influential members of Spanish society have access. One of his unforgettable gestures was the first embrace of Yassir Arafat by a West European head of government; also his conversation with a minister of the so-called Independent Democratic Republic of Sahara, which Spain does not recognize; his didactic conversation with President Carter in the course of which he appears to have afforded the American President

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a deep insight into the secrets of the Arab question; his open support for the social democratic Presidential candidate in Venezuela, whose opponent then won the election; the Quito declaration of 1979 abandoned its traditionally neutral position and condemned the authoritarian regimes of Latin America and the Lima declaration of summer 1980 condemning the military coup in Bolivia which still is part of the community of Hispanic peoples, an endeavor to which the Spanish head of government has assigned high priority in the international field.<sup>1a</sup>

#### Basic Policy on Madrid Meeting

The cumbersome task of spelling out the government's official foreign policy fell to Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, who was foreign minister for 4 years until early September 1980. Oreja is an experienced and patient diplomat. Throughout his term in office, he was at pains to effect an intellectual and political reconciliation between the many different tendencies which have a bearing on Spain's role in international affairs. Nonetheless, there is some dispute as to his record, since he neither appears to have been a mere executor of Adolfo Suarez' foreign policy aims, nor for that matter one of the main architects of government policy in the international field. The fact that he was replaced by Jose Pedro Perez Llorca in the course of the cabinet crisis in September 1980 does not point to important changes in basic Spanish policy vis-a-vis CSCE; the criteria for this policy having been laid down previously. Immediately after he was sworn into office, Perez Llorca made his first public appearance when he opened the CSCE preparatory meeting on 9 September. Afterwards, he told the press: "The cabinet reshuffle will not bring a change in policy. This is a UCD government, and I will follow the same line as my predecessor."

There is some justification therefore to base any analysis of the Spanish position on the statements made by Marcelino Oreja over the past months. He looked at CSCE along strictly western lines, underscoring this attitude of his by charging Ambassador Javier Ruperez with the preparation of the conference as well as its diplomatic and political direction. Ruperez belongs to the Atlantic wing of the foreign affairs community and until recently held the post of UCD secretary for international affairs.

Oreja's assessment of CSCE's future and of the Madrid conference is based on a pessimistic estimate of the world situation: "The start of the eighties is characterized by a marked reversal in the climate of detente which has been dominant in the relations between the superpowers over the past several years."<sup>2</sup> He added that "a crisis atmosphere such as has not existed since World War II" has arisen. To meet this challenge, "the western world must take concerted action and demonstrate solidarity in order to devise a containment strategy and to work toward political negotiations

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aimed at lessening tension in areas which touch on European interests directly or indirectly." The reference to containment strategy is of particular relevance in view of Oreja's having stated some weeks earlier that Spain would apply for NATO membership. In Oreja's view, the conflict situation takes in a "crisis arc" reaching "from Afghanistan to the frontiers of the Maghreb"-- which means right up to Spain's backyard (even if the minister declined to say so out loud). Detente can be restored, if conditions are created which favor the solution of the American hostage crisis in Iran as well as a negotiated settlement leading to the complete and final withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and a solution of the Near East problem which is where "the key to peace, security and stability for the whole area is to be found," according to Oreja.

The Spanish minister strongly denied the contention that the holding of the CSCE Follow-Up Meeting in Madrid might have a bearing on Spain's plans to join NATO which had after all been made part of the governing party's platform prior to the selection of Madrid as the site of the new CSCE meeting. "It seems as though some countries thought they might bring some influence to bear on questions concerning Spain alone in connection with the CSCE meeting," Oreja told the press on several occasions. "That is unacceptable."<sup>3</sup> It may be assumed that Oreja was referring to the Soviet Union, among other countries. In fact, a number of high-ranking Soviet spokesmen had let it be known that the Soviet Union was opposed to Spain's joining the alliance, stating that they considered it inadvisable to expand the power blocs at a time when detente was bearing practical results. Furthermore, they said, the choice of Madrid as the site for CSCE could be viewed as a kind of recognition of Spain's impartial policy toward the blocs.<sup>4</sup>

The connection between the Afghanistan problem and Spain's decision to move more quickly toward NATO membership is reflected in the following statement by Oreja: "We hope the Soviet Union will be coming to this (CSCE) meeting after making an effort toward a solution of the Afghanistan crisis. This crisis is the reason for a certain cooling-off of relations between Madrid and Moscow which had been developing quite satisfactorily over the past several months prior to the Afghanistan issue's becoming acute."<sup>5</sup> But this statement left the question unanswered of how far the invasion of Afghanistan has influenced a Spanish government decision which might equally well have been taken one year hence.

But the minister was at pains to deny any trace of a militant, anti-Soviet attitude and laid stress at all times to the importance Spain attaches to a continuation of the detente process. In his view, the following criteria were characteristic of detente:

1. Detente can neither be equated with peace, nor with cold war.
2. It is a dynamic situation; a continuing process with its ups and downs.
3. Detente goes beyond a purely military dimension to

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include the broad areas of security, cooperation and the respect for human rights. 4. Detente must be of global and not merely European scope. 5. There is no detente without security; but there can be no security without development and no development without a respect for human rights.

Spain's ambassador to the Madrid conference, Javier Ruperez, concurs with Oreja on the value of detente, but has taken a polemical stance in opposition to unwarranted assertions concerning Spanish foreign policy. "Our goal of joining NATO," the ambassador told journalists, "does not have an untoward effect on the conference for security and cooperation. The role of host does not make Spain a captive and its freedom of action in the western world is not impaired thereby."<sup>6</sup> The ambassador stressed that "the government has not agreed to any conditions so as to have Spain selected as the site of CSCE. On the other hand, the Soviet Union may have harbored some illusions in this regard. It is also possible that there will be a vote to have the next CSCE meeting take place in some Eastern or Western country-- after all, each of the 35 participating countries enjoys equal rights."<sup>7</sup>

Since the foreign policy of democratic Spain has not yet gone beyond the formative stage, one may well ask how much of an influence individuals have had on its formulation. In Ruperez' case, one must take his extensive knowledge of the origins, the principles and proceedings of the Helsinki conference into account which he attended from start to finish. He told of his experiences in a book entitled "Europe between Fear and Hope."<sup>8</sup> As chief of cabinet to foreign minister Oreja, he had preferred access to diplomatic data and first-hand reports. Later on, as the UCD's secretary for international relations, he was given the job of improving the image of the party as a member of the alliance of the other centrist, conservative parties of Europe and to give it more visibility. In this post, he also had an opportunity to help alter the government's views regarding the Maghreb crisis by modifying the latent anti-Moroccan posture of the "elites" of a centrist party which was unwilling to drop normally progressive positions to benefit the left wing, such as the defense of the Saharan people and of the Polisario Front. Kidnapped by the Basque terrorist organization ETA in November 1979 and released one month later, his personal experiences were bound to lead to extremely negative views regarding the connections between Marxist-Leninist, secessionist Basque terrorism and the so-called revolutionary regimes of the Arab world. Charges that ETA has been receiving support from the governments of Algeria, Libya and South Yemen as well as from the PLO in the establishment of training camps in Lebanon have had a salutary effect in moderating Spanish policies, which generally favor the Arab cause and have returned them to the plane of realism.

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At any rate, Ruperez' appointment as ambassador to CSCE has led to several hard and decisive statements. When Ruperez was asked for his views on Spain's participation in the non-aligned summit in Havana in 1979, he said: "That was a calamity."<sup>9</sup> When asked to comment on Brezhnev's warnings to Spain not to join NATO, Ruperez answered: "In this world we all have our own ideas as to what others should do. For my part, I would advise other countries to leave the Warsaw Pact."<sup>10</sup>

Do statements such as these by the CSCE ambassador indicate that Spain will adopt a hard and hostile position vis-avis the Soviet Union? Certainly not. Without a doubt, these statements reflected the spirit of the moment and not matters of substance. Besides, Ruperez was not going it alone; this position was by and large adopted by the government particularly immediately following the visit by Soviet foreign minister Gromyko to Madrid in November 1979 and the invasion of Afghanistan. Both events had a negative impact on political circles and on public opinion-- Afghanistan particularly on the latter. The substance of the Spanish position, at least insofar as it is represented by ambassador Ruperez (who also is an important source of information as regards the diplomatic decisions affecting CSCE) was given concrete expression by him in the following statement: "I am in favor of optimistic skepticism. I am not one for a great many illusions. I know very well what the conference can bring about and what it cannot. I hope we can get a step ahead there."<sup>11</sup>

Which conditions need to be met in order to make this step ahead possible? The idea of balancing out the various CSCE components is of decisive importance. "We are going on the assumption that it is important for the work of the conference to strike a balance between the different aspects of it. The idea is," Ruperez says, "to achieve a balance between the two great tasks entrusted to this conference: between the thoroughgoing assessment as regards the fulfillment of the provisions of the Final Act by all signatories and the presentation of new proposals designed to intensify the efforts already undertaken to improve security and develop co-operation."<sup>12</sup>

This balance concept can be widened to include the subject matter of the CSCE negotiations. "Success or failure of the Madrid CSCE meeting will depend on whether real progress can be made in simultaneously continuing to develop the chapters or baskets comprising the Helsinki Final Act," Ruperez said. "It is therefore inconceivable that agreements on, let us say, economic or military cooperation could be reached in Madrid without at the same time arriving at certain concrete decisions about human rights practices in the countries which took part in the Helsinki deliberations."<sup>13</sup>

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The idea of balance goes hand in hand with the full safeguarding of the rights granted to all states by the Helsinki Final Act: 1. The Final Act is the common property of all European states and citizens. 2. Every participant has the right to ask to what an extent the provisions of the Final Act have been fulfilled by every other participant. 3. According to the provisions of the Final Act, the Helsinki principles should not only apply to the bilateral relations between the signatories, but also between these and third countries. Detente is indivisible.

#### Outlook for Individual "Baskets"

Simply put, Spain will adhere to the Western position at the conference, based on the Helsinki guidelines and prepared to allow examination of their fulfillment. But how can this starting position be reconciled with the necessity to achieve "balance" among the various baskets and with the condition that the future of the conference itself must be safeguarded? And how can this construct be reconciled with Oreja's own desire "to present concrete and realistic proposals with a view to redefine and further develop the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act?"<sup>14</sup> At this point we must look at what Spain intends to put into the various baskets by examining the issues and analyses contained in the position papers prepared by the foreign ministry and by the study center for national defense of the defense ministry.

#### /Security/

A solution of the Afghanistan crisis would help revive the process of detente. But a speedy solution of the problem appears unlikely. Under the circumstances, there is little likelihood that the Madrid conference will create a climate conducive to fostering a new phase in the detente process such as a European conference on arms control and disarmament. Nonetheless, the Madrid conference has been given a mandate for discussing practical ways of applying confidence-building measures and will try to work for an intensification and expansion of these measures. In view of the fact that Spanish military activities have no decisive impact on the European strategic balance, since the Iberian peninsula is far removed from the central front and since Spain's armed forces are relatively modest, Spain can come out in favor of lowering the numerical limits on maneuvers and military movements. It could also advocate measures aimed at itemizing defense budgets but could turn down the proposal to refrain from the establishment of new military bases. It would not be interested in obtaining advance notice of naval exercises in view of the fact that it has six maritime neighbors. It could advocate a modest increase in the number of observers invited to attend maneuvers.

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Even though Spain affixed its signature to the Helsinki Final Act, it submitted a memorandum prior to the concluding session at Helsinki in which it expressed reservations with regard to the inviolability of borders, which to all intents and purposes referred to the Gibraltar issue. The start of official negotiations between Spain and Great Britain in 1979 aimed at solving this problem is not supposed to leave the question of sovereignty out of consideration. These negotiations will doubtless have a bearing on the Spanish position on this problem during the conference although Gibraltar is a foreign base representing a threat to the surrounding area of Spain and densely populated with people who have nothing to do with the strategic interests of the colonial power. As outlined below, the Gibraltar issue does have some interesting human rights aspects, however.

#### /Cooperation/

Spain is aware of the difficulties militating against cooperation between societies grounded in different socio-political systems. It will try to support all measures aimed at cooperation in environmental protection, technology and in economic relations which are realizable in the short term. Among them are: 1. Keeping rivers clean and protecting the large inland seas; 2. Replacing bilateral and multilateral agreements by a process of institutionalizing economic relations, currency convertibility, reciprocity in the establishment of industries and an integrated transport and communications system; 3. on the one hand, free communication between scientists and on the other hand, non-partisan support for sociological research programs, etc.

#### /Human Rights/

It is to be expected that the Spanish delegation will lay great stress on the question of human rights. Spain, which only recently (in 1976) ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and did not join the Council of Europe until 1977, has been presenting itself through the person of King Juan Carlos and through its government as a staunch proponent of human rights and has defended these rights vigorously and emphatically at Buenos Aires<sup>15</sup> and in all of Latin America generally. The Spanish constitution of 1978 gives recognition to the "moral authority" of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to all treaties and agreements dealing with human rights and ratified by Spain.<sup>16</sup> The new military regulations, too, strictly adhere to these constitutional provisions. The government feels that this historic decision gives it more of a voice in calling for conforming to and intensifying the adherence to the Helsinki human rights provisions. Since the Spanish delegation is convinced of the right of individual countries to inquire as to the extent to which others have complied with the Final Act, there is reason to expect an active posture on this issue as compared to the pragmatic and reserved posture evinced by the Spanish contingent at the Helsinki and Belgrade meetings.

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Given the present state of public opinion in Gibraltar, it is quite possible that the inhabitants of the British colony will register a complaint at the Madrid conference over the infringement of their human rights as a result of Spanish restrictions on traffic across the border. If this should happen, Spain has its answer ready: The frontier between Spain and Gibraltar will be opened the moment that the Gibraltar authorities are ready to grant to Spaniards in Gibraltar the same rights that the Spanish government is ready to grant to the inhabitants of Gibraltar in Spain. In fact, the Spanish-British negotiations have largely centered on the laws in force in Gibraltar which discriminate against Spaniards and which were rigorously applied until the closing of the frontier by Spain.

With regard to the right of information, the Spanish position is based on article 20 of the constitution which affirms the principle of the free flow of information. CSCE could help realize this principle with those responsible for the information being at liberty to investigate and work out new ways for guaranteeing this right, either as individuals, as business firms or as corporate entities. It is likely that Spain will support the EEC countries' proposal calling for free importation of newspapers and magazines; for the unrestricted export and re-export of all materials needed by journalists and not just technical equipment; for the establishment of foreign press associations in all capitals; for unhindered access to news sources by journalists, etc.

/Mediterranean/

It is very likely that Spain, which came out for the participation of the Mediterranean countries in the Helsinki and Belgrade conferences, will seek to limit discussion of the Mediterranean issue to the area of cooperation in consonance with the formula adopted at Belgrade. It is unlikely to press for additional representation by countries in the area, but will emphatically call for a solution of the Near East problem, including a revision of Resolution 242 and the recognition of the national rights of the Palestinians. There is no reason to expect that Spain will present or support any resolutions dealing with security in the Mediterranean.

/Conference Outcome/

At a minimum, the Spanish delegation will ask that a new site and date be agreed upon, so to assure the continuity of the CSCE process.

There are no signs pointing to any great hopes on the part of the Spanish delegation for combining the Madrid conference with a European disarmament conference, although Spain has been following French moves along these lines with favor.

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Spain is very likely to come out in favor of "small follow-up meetings" on the heels of the Madrid conference. As Ruperez has said, one such meeting should be devoted to a study of all social and political sciences; a second to Mediterranean problems, and a third to the political solution of conflicts so as to apply and expand upon the experiences made in this field prior to the Madrid meeting.

FOOTNOTES

1. On 5 September 1980, former foreign minister Marcelino Oreja and the Spanish ambassador to CSCE Javier Ruperez made public the Spanish government white book entitled "Report on Spain's Compliance with the Provisions of the Final Act Signed on 1 August 1975 at the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe." The white book was compiled by a group of experts from various ministries concerned with CSCE affairs and subsequently coordinated and systematized by a group of foreign ministry experts. Hectograph version, Madrid 1980, 629 pages.
- 1a. These statements were made at meetings of the Andes Pact.
2. Address to the Austrian Society for Foreign Policy and International Relations, Vienna, 23 July 1980, published by the office of diplomatic information, ministry of external affairs, Madrid 1980.
3. Statement given to EL PAIS, Madrid, 15 June 1980.
4. According to press reports (ABC, Madrid, 18 March 1980) the minister president is reported to have said: "I have written communications in hand from Brezhnev which are couched in diplomatic language but can be understood to point to possibly harsh reactions in case Spain joined NATO now."
5. Statement given to EL PAIS, op. cit.
6. Report by Brussels correspondent of YA, 13 July 1980, containing several statements by Ruperez.
7. Ibid.
8. Javier Ruperez "Europe between Fear and Hope," Madrid 1976.
9. Report by Brussels correspondent of YA, op. cit.
10. Statement given to BLANCO Y NEGRO, Madrid, 6-12 August 1980.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.

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13. Statements given to the EFE press agency which appeared in the Madrid press on 21 August 1980.
14. Address to Austrian Society for Foreign Policy and International Relations, op. cit.
15. On the occasion of a visit to Argentina by King Juan Carlos in November 1978.
16. Cf. catalog of basic rights of constitution, EA 4/1979, p. D 111ff.
17. Cf. EA 8/1978, p. D 246ff (D 248).
18. Cf. the three CSCE meetings of experts between the meetings in Belgrade and Madrid, EA 17/1979, p. D 441ff.

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ENERGY ECONOMICS

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

PROGRESS IN CONSERVING ENERGY REPORTED

Hamburg STERN in German 30 Oct 80 p 216

[Article by Kurt Bremer: "The Fairy Tale of No Electricity"]

[Text] The nuclear lobby is fighting indefatigably for new atomic power plants--while energy consumption in the FRG is declining.

With 46 laws, decrees and regulations and 30 million marks in tax money spent on informational brochures and newspaper advertising, the Federal Government has forced its citizens to conserve energy since the first oil crisis of 1973. Successfully: Germans--according to the calculations of the Energy task Force--are consuming 3.5 percent less energy this year than in the same period last year. The FRG is conserving 8 percent just in oil. In 1980, it is estimated, it will consume altogether about 18 million hard coal units (SKE) less for heating, driving and burning than in 1979 (408 million)\*.

The densely populated industrial area of North Rhine-Westphalia saved the most. Occasionally its inhabitants cut back electrical consumption up to 12 percent over the previous year. North Rhine-Westphalia's Minister for Economics Reimut Jochimsen said: "At the moment we have an electricity surplus, even a generating station surplus."

The heads of German energy companies do not like to hear words like that. For years they have been fighting as a nuclear lobby for the rapid expansion of nuclear energy to generate electricity. Rudolf von Bennigsen-Foerder, the head of Veba [United Electricity and Mining Corporation], had set the course: "The contribution of nuclear energy must be increased substantially by the year 2000. That means constructing 30 Biblis-type nuclear power stations."

Proponents of nuclear energy support their arguments with a gloomy vision of the day when the lights go out across the FRG. They found a ready listener in the government in Minister for Economics Count Otto Lamsdorff. Last week he was

\*The consumption of all energy functions is converted into hard coal units in order to come up with comparable figures. One hard coal unit equals the thermal value of 1 kilogram of hard coal.

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arguing emphatically in favor of having the annual construction of one or two nuclear power stations written into the government's program.

But the successful conservation of energy of recent years has long since refuted the old rule of thumb of the power station economy, which held that energy consumption doubles every 10 years because increasing economic growth can only be achieved by higher energy consumption. Now the balance looks different: with stagnating energy consumption the FRG achieved a growth rate of 3.6 percent in 1978 and 4.5 percent in 1979.

Successful energy conservation has upset all calculations about future energy needs. In 1973 the Government estimated probable consumption in 1980 at 510 million hard coal unit tons, while the Eco-Institute in Freiburg, which is more sympathetic to nuclear opponents, missed by only 3 million tons, with a prediction of 393 million tons.

In light of the conservation figures Lambsdorff's march into the nuclear state, with its multiple safety risks, can hardly be justified. This is even more valid, because in future less economic growth and a continued decline in energy consumption must be expected. Consumption could be cut even more if German power producers were to raise their prices and prevent energy waste by doing so. The reason: industrial large-volume users get electricity at giveaway prices of between 3.5 and 7 pfennigs per kilowatt-hour. Small consumers are asked to pay amounts of up to 40 pfennigs per kilowatt-hour.

The FRG is just beginning to develop possibilities of conservation. German households waste 55 percent of their energy unused. In traffic 83 percent of the energy generated goes into the air. And in industry too, Professor Steiger from Zurich discovered, "more than half the energy is squandered uselessly."

Once committed to energy conservation--as the Bundestag Energy Study Commission has calculated--the FRG will not need more energy in the year 2000 than in 1980.

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COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

TANK OUTLOOK REVIEWED--French industrialists are without illusions concerning the willingness of the Germans to participate equally in the planning of a tank for use by both countries in the 1990's. An agreement in principle was signed last February. Now under the pretext of effecting savings, the Germans are demanding that the French adopt, without further ado, the chassis and diesel motor of the German Leopard 2. The French industrialists have suggested to Minister of Defense Joel le Theule that they, on their own, make a 45-ton tank that is better adapted to the needs of France than would be the joint-effort tank of 55 to 60 tons. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 24 Nov 80 p 27]

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

## PSF'S DILEMMA, NUMEROUS CANDIDATES MARK 1981 ELECTION

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 27 Oct-2 Nov 80 pp 45-47

[Article by Thierry Pfister: "The Way to the Stars"]

[Text] Mr Coluche [a music hall performer] is a candidate! Before leaving for his island in the Caribbean, he is seriously preparing to try the experiment. Originally, however, it was only a whim. He offered himself as the "nothing candidate" with the keyword "The politicians make fun of us. Let's make fun of them a little." And, surprisingly, people began to stir, to telephone. They took the idea literally. Mr Coluche, without having really wanted to, is seeing a preliminary group form around him. He is therefore taking up the challenge.

The Coluche episode reveals, in its way, the deep unrest that this first regular presidential campaign is arousing, that is to say, a campaign prepared for a long time in advance, without the rush brought about in 1969 by the resignation of General de Gaulle or, in 1974, by the death of Georges Pompidou. The disorganized ferment of the political world contrasts with the relaxed feeling of the country. How many voters today are taking a serious interest in the 1981 ballot? Scarcely more than 2 million, according to the public opinion survey experts. The politicians are fully aware of it. Thus on Wednesday, Jacques Chirac, during the "Face the Nation" broadcast on France-Inter, spoke of "the lack of interest that the French people are showing in this matter." He immediately drew a personal political conclusion by refusing to state, before the end of the year, whether he will be a candidate or not. "This type of shadow theatre in which we are living," he explained, "does not seem to me to justify, by a lack of clarity, one making a serious determination." This is also the opinion of Francois Mitterrand.

De Gaulle had warned us: after him there would not be a void but an overflow. In order to struggle against the proliferation of candidacies, the constitutional regulations have been made stricter. This scarcely seems to restrict people's appetites: four candidates for the extreme left (one Maoist, two Trotskyists, and one PSU [Unified Socialist Party] and two for the extreme right (Messrs Le Pen and Gauchon); one for the royalists; three for the ecologists (Roger Garaudy, Brice Lalonde, and Jean-Claude Delarue); an as yet undetermined number in the center, a little more to the left or a little more to the right, among them Michel Crepeau (MRG [expansion unknown]) and Eric Hintermann (Social-Democrat Party), pending the arrival of Michel Jobert. There are already two socialist candidates: Michel Rocard and Jean-Pierre Chevenement. Already two Gaullist candidates: Michel Debre and Marie-France Garaud. And then, in reserve, Messrs Mitterrand and Chirac, of course.

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## Wide Array Is Harmful

It is of course desirable, in a democracy, that all trends can be expressed, that minority opinions can participate in the life and decisions of the community. It was even for that reason that parliaments were invented. It is at this level that what have been called the "little parties" should be able to be heard. It is unfortunate that the electoral rules and French political practise do not permit this. It is unfortunate that neither the ecologists, nor the extreme left nor the extreme right have been able to send representatives to the European Assembly of Strasbourg. It is, on the other hand, necessary that at certain times majorities are able to be established and rallies to take place. This is the function of the presidential election. The wide array of candidates is, at this level, harmful. Even more so since the argument according to which the presidential election allows the silent to speak is debatable. The multiplicity of candidates makes the television viewer tire even more quickly of the official campaign that is offered him between news bulletins and commercials!

The need for the procedure of appointing the head of state to keep its rallying value is particularly vital now. For, as Jacques Chirac himself notes: It is the institutions of the Fifth Republic that are today threatened by the fact that we are "evolving little by little toward a system in which there is no longer a real or a potential majority."

It seems that the need to obtain the sponsorship of 500 representatives distributed in 30 departments in order to be able to get into the Elysee would be enough to limit the debate to the "four major candidates." Even for Brice Lalonde, even though he occupies a good niche, is struggling to gather signatures. So, why is there this rush for the candidacy? Should it be attributed to the excessive haste, the lack of composure, of the political class? Has the state-extravaganza taken it away?

To look at things from close up, nothing has in fact changed, while everything appears different. The most convincing example is that of the Socialist Party. If one excludes the effect of mobilizing the media that was desired and obtained by Michel Rocard, in spite of a mediocre benefit, what is left? The deputy from Yvelines will stand for the candidacy within his party. Everyone has known it for months. Jean-Pierre Chevenement has decided to attempt to bar his way if Francois Mitterrand does not do it. Everyone has known this for months. The first secretary is loathe to enter into a new campaign. Many people have known this for a few weeks.

What is really different is that since 19 October, the Socialist Party has embarked upon the official procedure of appointing its candidate, a procedure desired and decided upon by Francois Mitterrand. The potentialities of yesterday, confirmed today, become acts that take place in a process that is in principle irreversible. By being, once again, the first to start, Michel Rocard forces the other socialists to make their decisions in accordance with his approach, whereas up to now it was the deputy from Yvelines who seemed forced to await the choice of the first secretary. He is even taking the credit for appearing to grant Francois Mitterrand the post of first secretary which he is not in a position to take away from him. In addition, by making the first move, Mr Rocard is blocking Francois Mitterrand's friends from making a final attempt to put pressure on the first secretary. Paul

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Quiles was preparing to publish a list of a few dozen departmental union groups which desired Mr Mitterrand's candidacy. The effect was a failure as soon as the deputy from Nièvre announced that he would speak that weekend. The game was no longer being played within the party but entirely in terms of personal choice between two individuals.

Only the candidacy of Francois Mitterrand is capable of preventing Mr Rocard from obtaining the nomination of the Socialist Party. If only because the deputy from Yvelines states that he will be faithful to his commitments and that, in any case, he would stand down in favor of the first secretary. So Jean-Pierre Chevenement knows very well that the barrier he is trying to erect is more symbolic than real. But the leader of the CERES /Center for /Socialist/ Studies, Research, and Education/ means to pocket a few dividends through this operation. Firstly by strengthening his political weight within the PS if he succeeds in monopolizing all the opposition to Michel Rocard in a single name. Secondly by starting to get not only his party but also public opinion accustomed to the idea that he could one day be a real candidate for the Elysee. After all, he is only 41 years old and it is always good to keep a good length ahead of tomorrow's rivals, named Lionel Jospin or Pierre Joxe.

#### Gaullist Vacillation

If Mr Mitterrand chooses to let Mr Rocard run, even though he might push himself to the forefront between now and the election in the event of a serious lapse on the part of the deputy from Yvelines, it is because, as many people are doing, he is questioning his solidity. Is not Mr Rocard as a candidate, capable of being, in 1981, what Mr Chaban was in 1974? This fear has been revived by the style of the official announcement of the mayor of Conflans-Sainte-Honorine's candidacy, in the same way as it had been fostered by his statements on the possible sending of the French Navy along the coasts of Poland in order to pick up any possible refugees. At this level, Michel Rocard will always have to answer for his past. For, for the last 20 years, he has held or stood behind a lot of speeches that are difficult to reconcile. Even if, today, he has found once again the tone of the reformist higher civil servant that he was in 1966 at the time of the "new left" conference in Grenoble and under the pseudonym of Georges Servet, he cannot make people forget the leftist period of the PSU, his marching in the streets arm in arm with Alain Krivine, his criticism of the Union of the Left until 1973, his rallying to a "Joint Program" that was lampooned for so long and that has been relegated again today to the trashcans of history.

On the other hand, Mr Rocard benefits from the fact that attacks against him can scarcely be anything but political. A new man, or at least perceived as such, he stands out clearly against an exiting president who is entangled in his "affairs" and a majority which always seems to be trying to hide some skeleton or other in its closet. On this level, the majority feels more at ease against a Mitterrand whose long career permits, if necessary, questions on his personal life. Nevertheless, since the beginning of May, Jean Riolacci's team, which has been preparing Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's campaign in the Elysee, has decided to include Mr Rocard's candidacy in its working assumptions. Since that date, then, the life and statements of the deputy from Yvelines have been gone through with a fine toothcomb.

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However, on the subject of knowing which of the two socialist leaders is definitely the more dangerous for the president of the Republic, the Giscardian staff is divided. A majority is inclined, however, to think, as do the RPR /Rally for the Republic/ members, that Francois Mitterrand, by reason of his stature and his experience, would be in the best position to put Valery Giscard d'Estaing in difficulties.

Even though, in this area, the Gaullist list is still lacking clarity, to say the least. Although there was reason to think, for a while, that Jacques Chirac not only wanted Mr Mitterrand to stand as a candidate but also wanted him to win once again, it seems that the "convergences" between the PS and the RPR which were stressed at that time are not as important as one might have thought. The mayor of Paris, who had nevertheless set the tone, now terms any idea of reconciliation between the two parties as a "ridiculous idea." And this change of tone, if not of direction, predates Michel Rocard's announcement of his candidacy. Moreover, Bernard Pons is no longer speaking of "convergences" but of "divergences."

The Gaullists seem to seriously think that they can be present in the second round of the presidential elections and that they can become the receptacle for all the dissatisfactions. Thus the tone used by Jean Meo in his criticism of Mr Barre and Giscard's economic policy, which will lead, he thinks, to "bankruptcy" and "revolution." The RPR hopes to beat the socialist candidate in the first round. Charles Pasqua is no longer alone in defending this thesis. Consequently, it is no longer a question of drawing closer to the PS but, on the contrary, of pointing out the differences and attacking it. And since, from this perspective, Michel Rocard is deemed less secure than Francois Mitterrand, the prospect of his candidacy is no longer displeasing to Jacques Chirac. As Mr Pasqua said: "What will happen to Rocard is what happens to souffles left in the oven too long: he will fall again. He is nothing but a product of opinion polls."

#### She Will Pull Off Their Masks

This is a prognostic not very different, then, from that of Mr Mitterrand's closest allies. And it is true that, until now, the deputy from Yvelines has been relatively protected. In the government, as on the communist side, the target is Mr Mitterrand. If only for the reason that Mr Marchais, too, is not hostile to Mr Rocard's candidacy. He thinks it will make his speech on the PS's "turn to the right" more credible.

But this curious unanimity of the political people on the vulnerability of Michel Rocard is based much more on calculations by instruments than on a clear perception of the nature and popularity of the deputy from Yvelines and of the socioeconomic levels on which he is relying. As Marie-France Garaud explained last Thursday evening on TF-1, "French politicians are a little like old actors who always play the same roles without noticing that the scenery has changed."

Strong in this conviction, and disapproving of the RPR turning into a party "pre-occupied with tactics and concerned with organizing or defending individual electoral situations," the former power behind the throne of Pompidou and Chirac throws herself in turn into the melee. Not in the same way as Mr Debre, who is trying to give the appearance of a candidate who is running in order to win and who,

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consequently, has just published the list of his support committee, which includes in particular 28 deputies and 3 senators. As disrespectful as it might seem initially, Marie-France Garaud's approach would seem to have more in common with Mr Coluche's approach. She is not running after power. At least that form of power. She only wants to pull off the politicians' masks, which she knows so well from having designed several. "I believe one should try to bring about a language of truth," she cries. What else is Michel Collucci, alias Coluche, trying to say when he protests against "politicians' politics" and tries to express the "fed-up-to-the-teeth" feeling they arouse. And who, already in September of 1978, said "that a certain political style or a certain political archaism is condemned; we should probably speak more truthfully and closer to the facts." Was it not Michel Rocard"?

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

HOW GARAUD AFFECTS RPR'S CHIRAC IN 1981 ELECTIONS

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 3-9 Nov 80 p 51

[Article by Georges Mamy: "The She-Devil Throws a Monkey Wrench Into the Campaign"]

[Text] Last Sunday, 26 October, we definitely felt that we finally had a reliable, though not really unexpected, indication of the intentions of one of the probable presidential candidates. Yes, Jacques Chirac was indeed going to run but had decided to remain silent on the subject until January for tactical reasons, hoping thereby to break loose from most of the pack. This is what commentators and RPR leaders had understood from statements made to them by the mayor of Paris. But now Chirac himself denies having made any such decision, or so it would seem.

"Not at all," he protested later to perplexed close associates who were, nevertheless, somewhat skeptical. "Things are still too confused. I will make my decision in January. Perhaps in February. Until then, I'll stay flexible...." And he then added an even more disconcerting comment: "To begin with, I have given the president a helping hand!"

It is true that the RPR chairman had punctuated his now customary indictment with the following alternative: "The only way to change a policy is to either change president or have the president himself change policy...and the latter is what we still hope will happen."

Was this what Chirac had meant by "a helping hand?" It looked more like a club to us. In any case, the rest of Chirac's remarks strengthened this impression. "Our strategy," Chirac had continued, "is to win. And to win, our candidate must of necessity be in the second round of the elections. Is this objectively possible? I can assure you it is." How could he "win" without ejecting Giscard?"

But how can the RPRP candidate already hope to arrive second in the first round so as to be Giscard's challenger in the second round? All we can do is report--without believing it--the prognosis on which Chirac's optimism is founded. He believes that "with the left completely fragmented," Mitterrand will receive no more than 20 percent of the votes, Marchais will get a maximum of 19 percent, and he, Chirac,--provided, of course, Debre has withdrawn--could in such a case reach 21 percent and thus narrowly be in the second round.

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## Resources and Obstinacy

If the truth must be told, this is not a convincing explanation. And Jacques Chirac is suspected of vaguely entertaining another hope, a fond hope, namely that Valéry Giscard d'Estaing will abandon the idea of seeking a second term. Thus "the helping hand" would seem to be contained in the first of the Chirac alternatives. In other words, it would consist in quite simply inviting Giscard himself to agree--by his own free choice or under external coercion--to "change president." In any event, Charles Pasqua, who is not considering for even 1 second the possibility of playing, for example, the socialist card as a substitute, has expressed it quite bluntly: "We do not want to have to choose between the plague and cholera."

Yet all of this smacks of Coueism. First of all, Michel Debre gives no sign of becoming discouraged. He is obtaining certainly very limited success in his tour of the provinces. But he does have the backing of about 30 RPR members of the National Assembly, some resources, and enough obstinacy to spare. No matter how little he succeeds, he will take votes primarily from Chirac, but a few from Giscard too.

As for Marie-France Garaud the neo-Gaullists have to-date found no pat answer to her candidacy other than to say nothing about it or show a bit of contempt. Yet they do look askance, nevertheless, at this she-devil who has never been known to launch into an operation without setting a definite goal for herself, or one which Pierre Juillet has chosen with her. Is she in this campaign today merely to "bear witness," to introduce a single issue into the debate, namely the idea of the danger of "Soviet hegemony" and of the effects it is having on French domestic policy through the expedient of the French Communist Party? "But I have become a candidate in order to be elected, what do you think!," she retorts whenever she is accused of distorting the spirit of the very institutions she claims to uphold.

## War of Nerves

Up to now, this formidable tactician has always based her actions exclusively on cynical realism and cold pragmatism. Can she, therefore, really believe she will be elected? The fact remains, however, that she has established her campaign headquarters in that caricaturally bourgeois apartment in which she previously shared an office with Pierre Juillet. It is located at 31 Quai Anatole France, opposite the Deligny swimming pool and the Place de la Concorde, and some 200 meters from the Palais Bourbon. She jokingly explains that she is waiting there for the "rank and file." She says she has received some financial backing and considerable encouragement from highly varied sources. She apparently even has no doubts about being able to obtain the required 500 "sponsors" signatures from mayors, members of the National Assembly and the Senate, the departmental councils, the city council of Paris, or assemblies of the overseas territories, but all located here and there throughout at least 30 departments. Furthermore, it is said that Marie-France Garaud could be supported by part of the National Center of Independents, a rightist political group which has lost much of its parliamentary representation but still has a very large number of local elected officials among its members.

Nevertheless, at the present time, nobody gives her the slightest chance of being elected. Yet everyone is now speculating about the havoc this disconcerting candidacy may create. Initially, Chirac's supporters hardly hesitated to charge that Marie-France "was working" for Giscard and against Chirac," that Bonaparte who will

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never be a Napoleon." In fact, within the Elysee Palace, officials were gleefully rubbing their hands. But not for long. In both the Elysee Palace and the Chirac camp, people are now already at a loss.

The distressing disorder of multiple candidacies could, of course, generally be favorable to the incumbent president viewed as a relative factor of orderliness. But once the parties of the parliamentary majority field four candidates, who can swear that Giscard, possibly weakened also by voter discontent and resentment, will not have his electoral support dangerously fragmented and dispersed? Elysee Palace strategists are seriously studying this possibility.

The war of nerves has just barely begun, however, inasmuch as we are still 5 months and 3 weeks away from the election (26 April and 10 May). There is even ample time for everything to change. The real candidacies must, or at least may be officially filed no later than 18 days before the first round of voting, in other words by 7 April!

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

PSF'S MITTERRAND-ROCARD DUEL: ANALYSIS OF STYLES, BELIEFS

On Opposite Sides

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 18-24 Oct 80 pp 144-147

[Article by Robert Schneider: "Mitterrand-Rocard: And I Don't Like You Either"]

[Excerpts] For a large number of voters and [Socialist Party] members there is still one very simple question to which most of them can find no answer. Why are these two highly capable leaders, both of whom have, in turn, topped French popularity polls, both of whom are representatives of a major party "of great promise," why are these two men tearing each other to pieces in this way? At the risk of jeopardizing their chances in 1981. At the risk of shattering a still very fragile party.

The first explanation of this feud is the sectarianism of some of their respective supporters. Judging from what the latter say, these two men have nothing in common. For many Mitterrand supporters, Rocard, the reformist, is at best a bridgehead between socialists and centrists, and at worst a Giscardian Trojan horse. In short, for them the choice is between left and right, between good and evil. For many Rocard supporters, the archaic Mitterrand is the embodiment of the left of economic incompetence and perennial failure. If we believe these opposing views, the choice, therefore, is between modern socialism and the socialism of the good old days, between the future and the past.

Apart from these caricatural portraits that are quite the rage within the Socialist Party (PS) itself, are the two men and their policies really so different?

"Mitterrand and Rocard do not appear to have come from the same planet," said a PS leader and former official of the Unified Socialist Party (PSU) who has known both men very well. While it is true that they have been moving in the same world for 20 years, the world of the noncommunist left, they have been at odds with each other more often than side by side.

They could have and should have gotten together as far back as 1959. At that time, Mitterrand was 43 years old. He had already served 11 times as a Cabinet minister under the Fourth Republic. He was one of the very few noncommunist political luminaries to oppose Charles de Gaulle. Rocard, on the other hand, was but 29 years old. A former leader of the socialist university students, he was one of the very few SFIO [French Section of the Workers International (French Socialist Party)] who immediately said "no" to the general. Mitterrand the lone wolf and Rocard the militant could have traveled a long way together. But no, the Autonomous Socialist

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Party (PSA), which Rocard was one of the first to join, would have nothing to do with Mitterrand. It considered him too implicated in the former regime's colonial policy.

From that time onwards, Mitterrand and Rocard have followed different paths. Their paths have crossed only once, for a brief moment, during the 1974 presidential campaign. A comparison of their two careers speaks volumes: whenever one of these two men would reach a high point in his career, the other would fade out of sight.

The paths of these two champions of socialism have crossed only once. This happened during the short presidential campaign of 1974. Rocard realized--at last!--in 1973 that the future now belonged to the PS. On Georges Pompidou's death, when Jacques Attali, Mitterrand's new favorite adviser, asked for Rocard's help, the latter unhesitatingly offered his services. With others, he drafted the candidate's economic platform. One of Rocard's close associates explained: "He was childishly fascinated by Mitterrand's personality and culture. Working at last in a large organization enchanted him." Mitterrand welcomed him almost warmly and flattered him. Rocard can still hear Mitterrand telling him: "When I say 'loan' to you, I want you to respond with the rate. That's what interests me. As for Jean-Pierre Chevenement, in such instances he responds immediately with a discussion of class warfare. Others give me technical lectures."

Their honeymoon was short-lived. The day after a disappointing showing in the first round of voting--Mitterrand received only 43.2 percent of all votes cast--the campaign staff met in the Trois Tours restaurant in Montparnasse. As is customary with Mitterrand on difficult occasions, the discussion was wide-ranging and covered everything but the essential point. Rocard, the newcomer, was nonplused. Rocard, the serious-minded adviser, grew impatient. Accustomed to the ritual-like leftist procedure, he asked that a chairman be named for the meeting. This was his first blunder, because it violated the rule that whenever Mitterrand is present the question of appointing a chairman never arises. Mitterrand is always chairman. Rocard then asked: "Who was responsible for communication matters for the first round of voting?" This was his second gaffe. The answer was nobody. In asking this question, Rocard had pinpointed the campaign's unpreparedness. He was to no longer play a major role in the campaign. This was the early beginning of a new and relentless feud between the two men.

After the election, Rocard entered the PS by the backdoor, as it were, and accompanied by only one-third of the PSU members. He was, however, never to participate in any major decision-making. In her book, "Michel Rocard ou l'Art du Possible," published by Editions Jean-Claude Simoen, Kathleen Kevin reports that Mitterrand told her: "Rocard was not even content with being a member of the leadership of a party he had constantly slandered, and associated with a man whose name he had dragged through the mud."

"Mitterrand had not forgotten that Rocard and the Christians of the left had always fought against him. Their moralizing discourses irked him. That particular left which had never stopped being 'new' for the past 30 years was, in his opinion, the left of futile palaver, naiveness, empty words, and impotence. The twosome of Michel Rocard and Edmond Maire was already worrying him. He suspected the secretary general of the CPDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor] of secretly working for his future rival. Nor did he like Maire very much. In their book, "L'Effet Rocard" [The Rocard Effect] published by Stock, Herve Ramon and Patrick Rotman quote Michel Rolant, the least "Rocardian" of the CPDT leaders, as follows:

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"Mitterrand does not know what a labor union is. When Maire and he meet, it looks like a meeting between the Queen of England and an Indian maharaja."

Rocard kept his distance. The night of the 19 March [1978] defeat [in the parliamentary elections], he assessed this defeat as follows in a televised interview: "The left has just failed to keep another rendezvous with history, the eighth such failure since the beginning of the Fifth Republic." Rocard had thus launched his offensive.

The war between the two lefts resumed. Mitterrand, the father of the Union [of the Left], clung to his status as a person of historical distinction while Georges Marchais kept him on tenterhooks. As for Rocard, he relied on support from the Algerian War generation, the May 1968 generation, the emergence of Christians into the left and of leftist party cadres into society.

Mitterrand's left, despite its denials, has definitely been influenced by the PC. Like the PC, it favors state control and centralization. Like the PC, it believes --or pretends to believe?--in the magic power of nationalizations. Like the PC, it contends that the economy can be controlled by political action. Like the PC, it harbors its share of daydreams when, for example, it proposes "to break with capitalism" in the 100 days following its assumption of power.

Rocard's left remains "decentralist" and regionalist, even though it has now tempered its "self-management" views with the approach of the presidential elections. It acknowledges the existence of economic constraints, recommends strict management, etc. It believes in teaching, and incomplete independence with regard to the PC which it has always militantly opposed. It believes also in a slow and prudent evolution toward democratic socialism.

The gulf between the Mitterrand left and the Rocard left has widened since March 1978 because of Mitterrand's keen desire to shift Rocard to his right. At the same time, Rocard is attempting to have the first secretary's ideas and personal image appear out-of-date.

The gulf is further accentuated by the highly contrasting personalities of these two leaders.

They differ in culture and also in style. Mitterrand is a literary man whose classical or flowery, and occasionally grandiloquent, style is heart-stirring and gripping. He is at his oratorical best at Socialist Party congresses and mass rallies. Rocard is a technician, a teacher who appeals primarily to his audience's reason. His favorite mass medium is television. Mitterrand likes novels and novelists. He is very fond of sauntering idly through the streets of Paris, even at the height of an election campaign. As for Rocard, he reads useful nonfiction: books on politics, sociology, economics and history. He is a hurried man who has been on the run for 30 years, carrying his black briefcase full of documents and reports. Mitterrand writes his own speeches and statements, whereas Rocard corrects and polishes those prepared for him.

These two leaders of the noncommunist left have to appear as complementary as possible, just for the election campaign. If Rocard is the candidate, Mitterrand can hope to retain leadership of the PS after 1981 only by supporting him, and without

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too many reservations. If Mitterrand is the candidate, Rocard can hope to succeed him only by supporting him, and without too many reservations. This shotgun marriage is indispensable to the party's survival.

The first persons to have realized this are the party militants

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#### Mitterrand's Position

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 31 Oct 80 pp 38-40

[Article by Arthur Conte: "Mitterrand Versus Rocard: Pros and Cons"]

[Text] For Francois Mitterrand, for a man of such eminent responsibility who experienced the exhilaration of power as a young man, there is still the temptation to engage himself once again in the prodigious adventure of trying to capture his country's highest elected office. It is not very easy to give up one's plan to rule. Furthermore, France's next president will assume responsibility for the country at a time when it may be able to play a major part in contributing to world peace. In all probability, while international life during the decade of the 1970's was, all things considered, rather lackluster, on the other hand, the decade of the 1980's gives promise of being highly historic. The French president will occupy an observation and command post of primary importance when the following tremendous events are likely to take place: the Soviet system's crisis, the building of a political Europe, the settlement of the staggering North-South problems, the peaceful harmonization of the Middle East, and Western Europe's conjunction with an Eastern Europe that will possibly have experienced a great and earnest desire for liberation or compelled recognition of that desire. For a man who is very self-confident, it would be an exciting experience to be able to live such events to the fullest. For more than 20 years now, Mitterrand has been fighting major battles in an effort to deserve well of history. If he now has to give all this up, it will undoubtedly be a dreadful jolt.

Moreover, he knows only too well that if he is not his party's candidate, it will be difficult for him to remain the party's "rallyer." If he leaves to someone else the privilege of directing the socialist battle in the election which is by far the most important election in the entire life of the Fifth Republic, he knows only too well that he himself will automatically lose too much of his prestige and authority. He will no longer exert the same powerful influence enabling him to remain at the helm. This initial decline in his authority will quickly be followed by others. Not only will history be made without him, but he will have less and less influence on "the very life of his party." He is not even assured of being able to help keep it united. Losing his main title means he will lose all titles. In that case, is it not worth the trouble of making a third run for the presidency? On balance, is this not his only chance to be useful to both country and party?

There are also many other factors that have to be considered, factors of at least a psychological nature.

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He has many friends pressing him, indeed exhorting him not to give up. It would be cruel to disappoint them.

Voluntarily removing oneself from the limelight is not as easy as some people think. There have been very few wise men who have either brought themselves to do it or resigned themselves to it with complete equanimity. Francois Mitterrand knows only too well that if he does not personally and directly confront Valery Giscard d'Estaing, he is thereby dooming himself to swift oblivion. Yet Mitterrand is obviously fond of being a great political performer. He thoroughly enjoys his image as such. He likes to speak in public and appear on television. He dreads darkness and silence. He is quite clearly aware that he will be immediately eclipsed by the socialist leader to whom he relinquishes the party banner. And he is not a person to quit. Above all, he is not a second-rater or weakling. There are even some touches of De Gaulle in Mitterrand: he has a certain epic sense and a certain taste for tragedy. Not only does he likely believe that Valery Giscard d'Estaing is not safe from every accident or sheltered from every storm, but he also believes he would personally have a much greater chance than others against any rival other than Valery Giscard d'Estaing. Hence his calculated plan to dealy as much as possible the date of his decision to run or not. But we cannot in any way picture him as choosing not to run. He is clearly allergic to abdication.

For all that, the risks involved are just as great as the inducements to persevere.

Francois Mitterrand is too astute and too sensitive to the interplay of the most underlying forces not to realize that his real and almost irreparable defeat dates back to the 1978 parliamentary elections. In other words, he buried himself, as it were, along with the Union of the Left. He had staked everything on that union. By losing it, he actually lost everything.

He is just as fully aware of the fact that his own image has aged and depreciated. He is now a "has-been," as the English say. Not that he is too old. He will be only 65 on his next birthday. General De Gaulle was 68 when elected president on 1958. Konrad Adenauer was almost 75 when, in 1949, as chancellor he assumed control of Germany's destiny, and did so with exceptional vigor. In the present campaign, Michel Debre, at 68, displays a strikingly jubilant desire to fight. Indeed this, is at least clearly the image he portrays on television. Francois Mitterrand appears to have grown old overnight. He seems to be out-of-date, overwrought, not "with it," a man of another period. He is still too unwilling to tackle economic problems. When compared with men who are considered experts, he definitely appears to be a complete laymen in such matters. This is a handicap which is now extremely difficult to overcome.

Lastly, Mitterrand is afraid of making a poor showing in the election. If he were finally to run, the worst thing for him would be to come in third in the first round of voting, behind Georges Marchais. In that case, he would not only lose all influence over the future, but his associates would consider him exceedingly culpable. If he were to come in third, the entire venture might even end up bordering on the ridiculous. This would be extremely unpleasant. Yet such a possibility is by no means absurd. It must be remembered that only two small points separated the socialist list of candidates from the communist list in last year's European [Parliament] elections. Georges Marchais is neither exaggerating nor bluffing when he says he can come in second behind Valery Giscard d'Estaing. Above all, it must be remembered that those who are called "minor candidates--extreme leftists,

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PSU, Roger Garaudy, Michel Crepeau, and Lalonde's environmentalists (ecologists)--will take votes away mainly from the Socialist Party candidate and thereby weaken him proportionately. It is by no means sure that Francois Mitterrand can place second, and he knows this better than anyone else. This possibility is evidently enough to make him think twice.

In any event, it is plain to see, all things considered, how much the pros counter-balance the cons in such a dilemma.

Thus there is no question that the Tintin of Yvelines [Rocard]--a "live wire" with an omniverous curiosity and very original style--cannot help but rejuvenate and revive socialist militancy. Mitterrand has fought in the forefront of too many battles since 1958. They have left him with an irrepressible feeling of lassitude. In contrast, Rocard will at least go into battle with all the zest of a newcomer. Besides, he is blithely and joyously eager. His, self-confidence is such that he is little troubled with self-doubts, at least to all appearances. He is more in tune with the rising generations than his elder rival is. The latter is a complete politician. As for Rocard, he is fundamentally both an economist and a Protestant, in other words, a technocrat and a mystic. Because he is the one most like Giscard and the Giscardians, he may well be Giscardism's most formidable rival. Moreover, the polls have demonstrated this with relentless regularity these past 2 years.

This time Rocard will symbolize both change and permanence at one and the same time. This is a tremendous asset. By simply showing a new face, he will give the impression of creating something new. Yet, because he too [like Giscard] is cast in the purest stylistic mold of a finance inspector--polished, discerning, and an ENA [National School of Administration] graduate--he will create the feeling, indeed the certainty, that with him there will be no reason to fear any excessively dangerous upheaval. This is profoundly clever: he offers a change in government without arousing any fear of a severe upheaval.

In Rocard, the Socialist Party could find a second impetus.

But the cons of a Rocard candidacy should not be underestimated. Rocard has a good standing in the polls because he is shielded by the semi-obscurity in which he must live. He has not had to burn his fingers in any fires. He can and does turn his competitors' negative results or liabilities to his account. Nobody can guarantee that he will hold his own in the campaign when he is projected into the glaring limelight. Some of his supporters expect him to work wonders. They may be cruelly disappointed. The granite his supporters are promising us may be only sand. The likelihood of success is as great as the likelihood of collapse.

For the moment, Rocard looks like a new face, even though he has already led an extremely full political life. Alas! a person ages rapidly once the spotlights of publicity are focused on his every action. Rocard may be young, but socialism is old and saddled with masks and fetishes that are very difficult to remove or exorcise.

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Rocard says he will offer original solutions. Yet he will be his party's candidate only if he pledges to support and abide by the party platform, which platform is as strikingly replete with rhetorical bombast and contradictions as the Union of the Left's now defunct famous "common program of government." Rocard will be placed under the thumb of the party machine and have much less authority than Mitterrand to free or separate himself from that machine. Despite his strength of character and creative talents, he cannot help but be a captive candidate.

There is even no assurance that he will preserve his party's unity, inasmuch as Jean-Pierre Chevenement and the CERES [Center for Socialist Studies Research, and Education] membership appear to be already determined to thwart him by whatever means are necessary. Hence Rocard's selection as socialism's candidate and leader may well coincide with the breakup of the party itself.

Lastly, it cannot be taken for granted that Rocard will carry enough weight to cope with Valery Giscard d'Estaing. Will not the president's profound and vast experience constitute too overwhelming a handicap to a man who has never had first-hand experience with the real problems of government? Mitterrand's supporters readily and very quickly answer that Rocard will show himself to be a "lightweight." This is a real possibility.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

MANUFACTURE, MODERNIZATION OF TANK TURRETS DESCRIBED

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Oct 80 pp 28-29

[Article by Pascal Gambiez, Weapons Engineer; "Armored Tank Turrets at GIAT"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] From the appearance of the first armored fighting vehicles during World War I, until present, the concept of armored tank turrets has developed in a manner which is, relatively speaking, as rapid as that of planes.

There is, in fact, almost as much difference between the turret of the F.T. tank and the AMX 10 RC, as between the Guynemer "Vieux Charles" and the Mirage 2000.

The first turrets only performed the basic functions:

- firepower,
- vision,
- protection.

These functions continue, but the development of tank and artillery combat has entailed enormous technological progress and, similarly, a much greater complexity of characteristics required for modern tanks.

A Specialization Enabling Attainment of High Level Technology

At present tanks must be designed taking the following elements into account:

- /the mission/: antitank (gun or missile), artillery, antiaircraft defense, or close-range defense;
- /the target/: distance, speed of maneuver, day or night engagement, level of protection;
- /speed of reaction/: which, depending on the case, entails manual or automatic fire control, motorized aim, optical or radar sighting equipment;
- /protection against/: a certain calibre at a certain distance, nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons;

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-/ergonomy/: adjusting the equipment and the machinery to facilitate the crew's mission;

-/weight/: an important factor in the tank's mobility.

-/structure of the turret/.

Within the DTAT [Technical Directorate of Land Weapons], the 10 plants of the GIAT [Land Weapons Industrial Group] participate in the production of a tank such as the AMX 30 and its ammunition. For the turrets, three plants play a vital role:

-AMX-APX (Versailles-Satory) and EFAB [Research and Production Establishment] (Bourges), plants which design the tank and its equipment,

-ATS [Tarbes Construction Shop] which has the specific tasks of putting the tanks into production and mass-producing the armored tank turrets.

The "turret" activity at this plant is an important part of its sales volume; more than 50 percent, for example, in the year 1978.

This specialization has enabled ATS to maintain itself at the forefront of developing and ever more complex technology, to acquire the necessary competence, to raise the technical level of its manpower to a high degree, to make the necessary investments, and to control all the technical solutions, transposing them from one product to another.

#### The Turret, An Offensive and Defensive Ensemble

In its "beginnings" as a turret manufacturer, ATS only handled, for practical purposes, the T 105 turret for the AMX 30 tank, this phase having lasted about 10 years; for several years now--based on the development of military requirements--ATS has left its uniform production of the T 105 turret (which is, however, still produced). It manufactures products derived from the T 105 and intended to equip updated versions of the AMX 30 (AMX 30 B2 and AMX 32). It also manufactures:

-the turret for the 155 AU F1 (former 155 GCT);

-the TK 105 turret for the AMX 10 RC tank, already in production, (carapace made of light alloy, completely automatic and very precise fire control);

-the TS 90 turret, an ATS-designed modular turret, intended to replace the AML H 90's bit by bit. The basic characteristics of this turret are: very effective artillery at high initial speeds, improved observation, improved habitability, and optional fire control.

This turret equips: the AMX 10 PAC, the Panhard ERC 90 Sagaie, and Renault Industrial Vehicle's VBC.

These various products have entailed considerable progress in the area of turret equipment, particularly:

-the Crotale's and TK 105's hydraulic sighting equipment

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-in part, the electronic equipment in the turret of the 155 AU F1, the TK 105, and the modernized T 105.

An important activity for ATS, finally, is the reconstruction of old turrets, major revisions of some kind; this activity is significant, considering the number of AMX 30 turrets of the first series reaching the overhauling stage.

Whether it involves weight, ranging from the Roland's carapace (a little over a ton) to the turret of the 155 AU F1 which weighs 17 tons, or the development from the completely manual sighting system of the H 90 to the TMS 32's (turret of the AMX 32) Costac fire control system which can engage moving targets, we see that a high level of technology is involved.

If we want to enter the mysteries of turret production, we must remember that turrets are composed of a weapon activated by a fire control, and that they are protected by a carapace which shelters the crew, the ammunition, and the transmission and sighting systems.

The /weaponry/ is supplied by EFAB, MAS and MAT, members of the GIAT industrial group.

The /carapace/ which offers protection from a battlefield environment is made of:

-either a cast hull (as in the AMX 30),

-or a mechanically welded armored metal hull, either steel or aluminum, and large parts; basket, plates.

This carapace requires the implementation of heavy welding and machining capacity (pieces weighing several tons with dimensions up to several meters).

To counter the effect of more and more effective projectiles, the ATS materials research center is pursuing investigations of new armoring materials; the research office defines their adaptation to turrets under development, and the production office studies their manufacturing conditions.

The /fire control/, which activates the weapons, is a generally very complex assembly which, symbolically, begins at the tank/turret interface (large diameter ball bearing ring, part of which is produced at ATS), continues with the mechanical sighting controls, and the hydraulic jacks, also produced at the plant, and the electrical or electronic equipment, as well as the optical and radio materials made by private industry.

For the modernized T 105 turret, in other words the AMX 30 B2, the electronic/fire control assembly is integrated into the gunner's sighting telescope. ATS will handle the integration of this telescope.

/Miscellaneous equipment/: welded or bolted seat supports, bins for air filtration, for ventilation, for ammunition storage all parts made at Tarbes.

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The overall assembly consists of mounting:

- a logical circuit - turret
- a sighting system (hydraulic or electric)
- an associated hydraulic control system (jack)
- a laser rangefinder system
- a television circuit
- a radio circuit
- possibly, a radar system
- plus a considerable amount of related equipment for gas exhaust, compression and ventilation of air, lighting, intercom...

To do this type of manufacturing, very diverse and costly investments are required: automatic welding machines, large dimension milling and boring machines, precision grinding and lapping machines, measuring and testing benches.

In any case, due to the diversity of production on the one hand, and the capacity of the equipment on the other, production equipment is grouped by "technology" and not by "product." Certain means of control or of integration do, however, remain specific to each product.

The development of the "turret" activity has required a considerable effort in terms of investment, training, and methodology.

This effort has permitted the development of three major models (155 AU F1, TK 105, TS 90) during the past 10 years, as opposed to a single model (T 105) during the ten previous years. The acquisition of turret capability by ATS thus largely profits the French Army.

By its nature as a production center with an important research office cooperating very closely with the design establishment (AMX/APX), ATS is able to find the technical solutions with the best cost/efficiency ratio in this area of armored tank turrets, in which it occupies a top level position on the international scene.

#### Guide to Abbreviations

DTAT: technical directorate of land weapons  
GIAT: Land Weapons Industrial Group  
AMX/APX: Issy-les-Moulineaux  
EFAB: Research and Production Establishment at Bourges  
ATS: Tarbes Construction Shop  
MAS: Saint-Etienne arms manufacturing  
MAT: Tulle arms manufacturing

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

BRIEFS

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS--An investigation by the defense committee [of the National Assembly] has shown that 54 percent of the conscientious objectors, who must serve 2 years [instead of one as do those drafted for regular military duty], are not reporting to their assigned jobs with the National Forestry Office. Requests for objector status have progressed from 789 in 1972 to 1,210 in 1979. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 17 Nov 80 p 31]

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

MARKIEGUI DEFINES POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF EUSKADIKO ESKERRA

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 26 Oct 80 p 31

[Article by EIA--Basque Revolutionary Party--executive committee member Xabier Markiegui: "Euskadiko Eskerra: Its Democratic Credibility"; for the statements by Mario Onaindia referred to in the first paragraph of this article see JPRS 76904, 1 December 1980, No 1661 of this series, pages 165-169]

[Text] The statements made by Mario Onaindia (secretary general of EIA) which appeared in the Bilboa CORREO ESPANOL on 8 October have been reiterated in the majority of the nation's press with unusual interest. Those statements have also had particular repercussions among the leadership of the state security, from which there has been leaked to the press a document with the general title "Tensions on the Abertzale Front," wherein they are attributed the value of an objective item of information indicating the tendency that is under way in Euskadi moving from positions of force toward those of political confrontation.

But the democratic credibility of Euskadiko Eskerra does not stem from those statements made by Mario Onaindia. He attests to it once again. Our democratic credibility was evident to those who were not blind, since we came into being in political life, since we took a chance, despite the strong opposition which prevailed then in the sociological sector of the Abertzale left, running in the general elections of 15 June 1977. At that time, we accepted the rules of the democratic game, despite its gaps and limitations, because we were convinced that the incipient democratic liberties were results (and good results) won by the people's long, hard struggle against Francoism. We are not masochists; we prefer liberty, not repression. And we believe that this democratic framework benefits the workers' and people's self-organization for their progressive liberation.

Subsequently, we wagered on the preautonomy and minigovernment of concentration which was the Basque General Council, despite the very meager content of the authority that was transferred and the provisional exclusion of Navarre; because we believed that it could be an instrument which would partially fill the absolute institutional vacuum and direct some of the many problems from which Euskadi suffered along paths of rationality and political dialog.

We also wagered on the effort for cooperation among all the Basque democratic political forces in the preparation, negotiation and approval of the Gernika Statute of Autonomy, because we considered it the only viable instrument for the democratic normalization of Euskadi, for the democratization of some of the state apparatuses and for visibility in the political expression of the class struggle.

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And if, in our campaign, we linked amnesty with the Statute, it was because we did not want to miss, on 25 October, an historic opportunity for the pacification of our occupied, demolished country. UCD [Democratic Center Union] refused; and PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] did not dare, because of despicable electoralist views, against its own class.

This democratic credibility, which has won the confidence of our people, as reflected in the constant electoral progress that has placed us today ahead of the Basque UCD itself, has nevertheless been systematically questioned by the centralist political forces, which always look northward with preconceived notions. We have been denied bread and salt, because we are in complete disagreement with the repressive policy of the consecutive UCD governments, because we continue to denounce their slowness and delays in implementing the State of the Autonomies and because the very democratic liberties included in the Constitution have neither been sufficiently guaranteed nor intensified.

We are distrusted because of our historical origin, which we do not disavow; on the contrary, we are proud of it, because who are convinced that those who have risked most in the struggle against the dictatorship place a higher value on the democratic conquests and will also risk more to defend them.

It is quite clear that, despite the systematic persecution, with arrests of our members, application of the antiterrorist law and their release by the judges, a thousands attempts have been made to push us into internal radicalization, so that we would cut ourselves off from the area of democratic action. Up until now, they have not succeeded; nor will they succeed in doing so. We know that Euskadi needs this new left.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

ULTRARIGHTIST CARMONA REVEALS BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS, FORMER CONTACTS

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 19 Oct 80 pp 41-49

[Text] One of the men implicated in the attack on the Catalan satire magazine EL PAPUS has told CAMBIO 16 about the details of the operation that left 1 person dead and another 20 seriously wounded.

This is the story of a 21-year old man, Isidro Carmona Diaz-Crespo, without specific political convictions but certain that violence was to be the natural course of his life. The story begins with his membership in the Communist League and reaches its zenith with his involvement in the planting of a bomb at the offices of EL PAPUS. It is also a story of sordid dealings, sinister plots and scoundrels.

Some weeks after making these statements, Isidro Moreno and the other members of the ultra command, who had been out on bail, were indicted for illegal possession of weapons and ammunition, the trial judge having overlooked possible crimes of terrorism that the defendants might have committed.

How We Planted the Bomb

Certain political concerns brought me close to the Revolutionary Communist League when I was just 16, Isidro Carmona relates. But after 3 months, a comrade who had been in the Municipal Police, Jorge Garcia Robleda, made me join the OJE [Spanish Youth Organization] at the Navarra Unit [hogar] in Barcelona. There, my political ideas began to take shape. I have to mention that my family was Falangist and that in the OJE we were taught Falangist and National Sindicalist doctrine. When I moved on to the Extremadura Unit, Mariano and Salvo, the heads of division, took us on an excursion with chains and clubs to really give a good beating to other groups of kids who were singing "Els Segadors" and "L'Estaca, which are Red songs.

This was in 1974, when I was just 17. Manuel Parra Celaya, who had been at the Hispanic Cultural Center for a while, was the unit chief and he used to take us over to provoke the Reds along Las Ramblas and at San Jaime Square. When Rafael Caballero became unit chief, I joined the Jose Antonio Circle; Ana Maria Gonzalez and Javier Garcia, who are heads of the (authentic) Falange today, were there. I got mad at these people because I found out that they were getting aid from the Civil Government and I didn't like it that the economic side of the picture and our activities might be manipulated. I then left for the

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Eugenio D'Ors Center. Ferruz Camacho was in charge of it at the time. Those were good times. We enjoyed a lot of favoritism from the police.

At a demonstration that Spanish Falange organized I met Alberto Royuela's son, Albertito, and through him I joined New Force (FN). There, I came into contact with Juan Jose Mosch Tapias, Ernesto Mila and a fellow by the name of Alsina, who were former members of the PENS [Spanish National Socialist Party]; in other words, they were Nazis. I also met Pedro Juan Guinea, who is now, I think, a sergeant in the Marines, which he volunteered for.

Albertito Royuela and I, who were radicals, wanted action. We made several raids on the Law Department, where leftist students used to tear down our posters, and there was a lot of fighting with clubs. Nothing happened to us because the police pretended they didn't see. We also did the police a lot of favors. Much later, Juan Bosch told me that the PENS operated as a para-police group and that even the services of the Government Presidency used them.

One day someone told us that a professor of information sciences was talking badly about us. So a few of us went over to set his ideas straight. It was the first time that I carried a pistol, though there were no bullets in it. We broke into the classroom, and Pedro Juan Guinea and Alsina stood in back while another comrade threatened the students at gunpoint. Ernesto Mila and Juan Bosch began teaching class and explaining our principles. I have to admit that our initial idea was to grab the professor, take his clothes off, paint him red and parade him around the classroom. But we didn't. The professor, seated at one of the desks in front, turned around and looked back every so often and asked his students whether they were going to stand for this. I couldn't hold back and hit him on the head with a club, which broke because it was made of wood. We then spray-painted the walls and left on the run.

Before Franco's death (in 1975 we already had contacts through Juan Bosch with the Italians in the National Vanguard), Albertito Royuela and I decided that we ought to take action ourselves, plant bombs, kidnap and undertake a revolutionary national struggle. Albertito and I, along with Pedro Juan Guinea, Torrens, Francisco Cami Aldaver and Vicente Rodriguez Pelaez, founded what was called Trade Union Action Groups (GAS). Each one of us was in charge of a zone. Pedro Juan Guinea had Hospitalet, and Vicente Rodriguez and I were in charge of San Andres. We staged a number of operations, one against the Borinot Ros Bookstore, which was owned by a guy from the CNT [National Confederation of Labor] and another against the neighborhood association. We painted everything. We carried off the card files and the money and I defecated inside. The report filed on this got nowhere, and you can imagine why.

After all this, we set fire to Socias Humbert's office, which was in Ronda de San Pedro. We were still members of New Force, but they were totally in the dark. Even Juan Bosch said that it would be ideal to be able to contact "this group called GAS." Around that time (the winter of 1975-76) we sent a communique to DIARIO DE BARCELONA noting that GAS was ordering a truce for the holidays. We were just kidding and we then resumed our attacks on neighborhood associations (the one in Hospitalet) and bookstores (Publia). We printed our own propaganda

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with the stencil machines that New Force had, because Royuela had the keys, and we did it at night, without anyone finding out.

On the eve of the Epiphany we did our thing in Pino Square, where the hippies sold books about the Chilean resistance, pictures and other kinds of Red things. We decided to teach them a lesson. We got into a chain fight with them and painted swastikas on their stalls. But a number of groups that were dancing sardanas to one side began calling us fascists and bastards. We ran to San Jaime Square and went into the Legionario Bar (the owner was in the Brotherhood of the former members of the Blue Division). A lot of our comrades were there, and about 30 of us went back to Pino Square. The Reds were waiting for us with clubs and everything. Finally, after a lot of clubbing, Pedro Juan Guinea took out his 6.65 and fired twice. Everybody froze, and we were able to leave on the run. We didn't see that the Reds had nabbed Francisco Cami Aldaver, who at the time was working in Alberto Royuela's electricians shop. The police were able to make a lot of arrests through him; even Royuela was called in for a statement.

There was a big stink. I finally gave myself up too. The police did not mistreat us at all, even though we said so later. Some other comrades and I said that Alberto Royuela, although he did not organize us, was always up on everything, and so they arrested him too. Francisco Cami Aldaver, Alberto Royuela, Francisco Ezquero, Pedro Juan Guinea, Vicente Rodriguez Pelaez, the head of New Force in Barcelona at the time, and I went to jail. Mario Oms, the New Force attorney, took up our case.

#### Fascist International

The warden at the Modelo Prison treated us sympathetically, and we didn't cause any trouble. After the head count at night, a guard who was a comrade used to come over; we would go down with him to the guard house, where they gave us dinner and where we played cards with them. The Civil Guard used to bring us coffee from the outside. Judge Gomez Chaparro gave us parole, and 2 months later we were covered by the amnesty. When we came out of prison, a lot of comrades were there waiting for us and we sang the "Cara al sol" and sat down for a bite to eat with Xirinachs' friends. He was still sitting outside the Modelo Prison asking for further amnesty.

They kicked us out of New Force after our arrest, and one night we raided their headquarters. We took Jose Antonio's pictures, the stencil machine and we put everything in Royuela's apartment. It was then that along with Angel Blanco, the Oriente brothers and some 20 others, we set up the JEP [Spanish Youth on Their Feet] and the FSO [Workers Socialist Front]. We continued to have contacts with CEDADE [Friends of Europe Club] and several news services. In addition, Juan Bosch had his own contacts in Lerida, chiefly with Gomez Benet. Bosch also had ties with two Italians, Mario and Giuseppe, who used to live in Meridiana between Fabra, Puig and San Andres. All of these people had something to do later with the EL PAPUS affair.

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The Italians taught us how to take pistols apart and handle them. They said that they had contacts with the Mafia and with the three existing fascist internationals (although around here people keep saying that this isn't so), which are the Fascist International, the World Anticommunist League and the World National Socialist Union. Through other contacts in Andorra (a guy named Pont Roura, who owned an antiques shop, and others whom I didn't know) Gomez Benet and Bosch got arms and explosives via Lerida, where Carbonnel looked the other way.

On Monday, Wednesday and Friday we held indoctrination sessions in Royuela's apartment and on Tuesdays and Thursdays we had classes in operations, the handling of arms and explosives, kidnaping and holdup techniques and psychological warfare. But I needed real action. Juan Bosch, Albertito Royuela, Francisco Cami Aldaver, Juan Carlos Pinilla, Antonio, his younger brother, and I began making explosives. We had Molotov cocktails, dynamite, nitrocellulose, slow fuses and mercury detonators.

One day Pinilla and I went to see a guy called "El Mataestudiantes," who was at the second district offices of Franco's Guard at 34 Blay Street. He gave us 2 P1 and P3 bakelite grenades, 5 or 6 meters of slow fuse and 5 No 9 detonators. At that time we used to meet at El Mesonero Bar, where members of the police would go. The Civil Guard information agents and Military Information people used to get together at the Clan Bar on Mayor de Gracia Street, and we went there every so often too and met with Antonio Ballester, who was also in Franco's Guard (and a thief), and Jose Manuel Macias.

We decided to stage holdups to finance ourselves. Macias, who worked at Roca Radiadores, proposed that we rob the strikers' fund, inasmuch as the company was being hit by a very severe strike at the time. According to Macias, the strike fund was in a chalet in the Gava area owned by one of the Roca delegates. We got in contact with a fellow named Navascuez, who was a city councilman and had a basement set up to hide comrades. We also spoke with a baker who was going to lend us his station wagon for the operation. According to our information, as a said, the money was in a chalet between Gava and Castelldefels. Juan Bosch, Macias, Pedro Juan Guinea, Juan Carlos Pinilla, Antonio Ballester, Albertito Royuela, Jose Luis Castellon and I met at night at Navascuez's house and then took the delivery van to the chalet. We had masks on. When we arrived, three workers came out and began throwing bricks at us. One managed to escape while we nabbed the other two at gunpoint. They said that the strike fund was not there, that it was in a bank in a delegate's name. We took them to an abandoned cabin close by and began beating and interrogating them. One of them fell to his knees. I then proposed (this took place a little after the Atocha thing) that we kill them because they were just Communists. Bosch began beating the fellow who was kneeling on the head with an iron bar. You could hear his skull crack and see the blood dripping on some cardboard boxes on the floor. He then started in on the other one. Macias, Pinilla, Castellon and I got very nervous. I said that it would have been better to shoot them once each. Bosch got angry then and said that if he ever asked us to do the same thing, we would have to do it. We read in the papers the next morning that one of the two almost died.

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After this failure, we then decided to kidnap the manager of Roca Radiadores, Vilaseca Marse, but Bosch told Gomez Benet about it, and he said that it was out of the question. We were also planning to kidnap Cardinal Jubany, the primate of Barcelona, but this didn't work out either.

It was very shortly thereafter, in February, that we made the assault on the Villaroel Theater. I had 250 grams of nitrocellulose that Macias had left with me, as well as detonators and a fuse. Albertito Royuela, Juan Carlos Pinilla, Antonio Ballester and I were involved. I went into the theater with Albertito, and we decided to plant the explosive by the side of the entrance. When I finally managed to light the fuse (I was very nervous), we walked to the door but then began running. As we turned the corner we heard the explosion. I then called the DIARIO DE BARCELONA and MUNDO DIARIO to claim credit for the bombing on behalf of the Triple A [Anticommunist Apostolic Alliance]. This was a phantom group; it never existed as an organization. It was our invention, but it began to get a reputation. Juan Bosch and Alberto Royuela found out and got really angry. Bosch almost kicked us out of the organization.

It was around that time that EL PAPUS came out with a history of the former members of the Blue Division, calling them all sorts of names. Many of our people were pressuring for us to do something to the magazine. We got information on the editor of the magazine, Xavier de Echarri Molto, so that we could kill him or kidnap his son. Royuela went over to talk with him and gave him a piece of his mind. Executing him was too risky, and a kidnaping even more so. We had explosives brought in from Andorra especially for the occasion. It was an American explosive. I didn't make the bomb, of course, but I'm sure it was, because we had five cartridges at the time and when they arrested us, they found only three.

We began a surveillance operation around the EL PAPUS building. We found out from a Barcelona newsman on what day they held editorial board meetings and we decided to set off the bomb in the editorial office one of those days. I remember that Bosch kept all of this information in a red notebook. To carry out the bombing we needed foreigners who moved around a lot and were not much watched by the police. Giuseppe and Mario were ideal and they were also real experts in explosives. I think that the tall, blond chubby fellow who delivered the package with the bomb to the doorman was Giuseppe. The two were arrested at the hotel where they worked because someone gave photos of them to the police. I suspect it was Alberto Royuela. Juan Bosch wasn't too sure about him either. I remember that Royuela was given an Alfa Romeo in Andorra by an Italian who was supposedly a member of National Vanguard.

But Giuseppe and Mario told us that this Italian was in fact a member of the antiterrorist brigade. This gave us reason to believe that Royuela might be working with them, besides his contacts with certain police agents.

In any case, after the bombing, Macias and I agreed to sell false information to the press because in this way we would be discrediting the mass media too. Royuela gave Macias some photos of Salvatore Francia, the famous Italian fascist, that were taken at a chalet in Blanes, to make it look like there had

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been a meeting of the Fascist International there. We began this campaign to discredit the media by making a number of unsuccessful visits to newspapers. As we were leaving the DIARIO DE BARCELONA, the cops arrested us because someone had squealed. I was carrying communiques with the code of the Triple A, and they took us to Police Headquarters.

At my house they discovered the typewriter that we used to write up the communiques, a few grams of gun cotton and a pistol. They later discovered all of the other stuff and arrested everyone else. A number of important figures in Barcelona and Lerida saw their heads roll.

I confessed several things, and we were all put in jail. The inmates were against us, shouting and spitting at us and yelling "death to the fascists." The famous riot at Model began when one of the regular inmates tried to blind Juan Bosch with a wire. The guards came and took the convict away, and then the whole melee began. The COPEL people saved us from certain death because the regulars were coming to get us.

We were then transferred to the Huesca Jail, which is for psychopaths. They gave me 7 days of solitary confinement there because on 20 November I put a sheet with the Falange flag painted on it in the window. They then transferred us to Las Salesas, to Courtroom No 2 of the Madrid National Court, which Judge Gomez Chaparro presided over. He ordered that everything be put at our disposal. Even though we were incommunicado, we would talk with Sanchez Covisa.

Ruiz Ballester, from New Force, was our attorney. Juan Bosch, Pinilla and I, the last three in jail, denied to the judge that we had anything to do with EL PAPUS. He also ordered us to deny everything, prior confessions notwithstanding. We denied everything that might have been connected with the EL PAPUS incident, and the only charge against us was illegal possession of arms and ammunition, as well as terrorist crimes. Gomez Chaparro asked me why I had declared before that I was involved in the EL PAPUS bombing. I told him that it was to save a comrade. They then transferred us from the courtroom to Ciudad Real Jail, where we also had the run of the place. A number of Falangists who came to say hello to us were even allowed to enter with the warden's permission. The day before Christmas Eve the attorney came with our parole, and we left that evening. The attorney told us that the matter would gradually be forgotten and that we would be acquitted on lack of evidence. And that's the way it happened. That's the story up to now, but it doesn't end here...

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Isidro Carmona, Mounting Violence

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46

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